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SENTENCING REFORM AND PROSECUTORIAL
POWER: A CRITIQUE OF RECENT
PROPOSALS FOR "FIXED" AND
"PRESUMPTIVE" SENTENCING *
ALBERT W.

ALSCHULER t

I. INTRODUCTION

In the American system of criminal justice, power over punishment is allocated primarily among four types of governmental

decisionmakers-legislatures, prosecutors' offices, courts, and correctional agencies (including, most notably, parole boards).' The
thrust of many recent proposals for sentencing reform has been to
reduce or eliminate the discretion of both courts and correctional
agencies and to increase the extent to which legislatures specify
criminal penalties in advance. 2 In "fixed" sentencing schemes,
statutes specify the exact penalty that will follow conviction of each
offense; in systems of "presumptive" sentencing, statutes specify a
"normal" sentence for each offense but permit limited departures
from the norm in atypical cases. Although prosecutors' offices, in
practice, have probably had a greater influence on sentencing than
any of the other agencies (including state legislatures), the call for
sentencing reform has largely ignored this extensive prosecutorial
power. In my view, fixed and presumptive sentencing schemes of
the sort commonly advocated today (and of the sort enacted in
* This Article is based on a speech delivered at the Conference on Determinate
Sentencing in Berkeley, California on June 2 & 3, 1977. The conference was sponsored by the University of California Law School and the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
f Professor of Law, University of Colorado. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard
University. Member, Illinois Bar.
1 In addition, governors exercise the power of executive clemency, and police
officers sometimes make "stationhouse adjustments" that effectively impose penal
sanctions.
2
See D. Foa., ... .. WE A E THE LIVING PRooF .. .": ThE JUSTICE MODEL
FOR COPa cTIONS (1975); M. FRANE,
CIMnmAL SENTENCES 103-24 (1972);
REPORT OF Tm TwENrTrTH C- rtmy FUND TAsE FORCE ON CRnMNAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PuNIsmvENT (1976) [hereinafter cited as FAmr AND CERTAIN
PuNismi=];A. voN HImsc, DOING JUSTICE 98-106 (1976). See also J. MI'FonD,
KIND AND USUAL PUNISM&ENT (1973); STmUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CmRnm
AND PUmIsHmENT IN AMERIcA (prepared for the American Friends Service Committee 1971) [hereinafter cited as STnuGLE FOR JUSTICE]; N.Y. Times, Feb. 3,
1976, at 13, col. 1 (views of Attorney General Levi); N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1975,
at 29, col. 1 (views of Senator Kennedy).
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California 3) are unlikely to achieve their objectives so long as they
leave the prosecutor's power to formulate charges and to bargain
for guilty pleas unchecked. Indeed, this sort of reform is likely to
produce its antithesis-a system every bit as lawless as the current
sentencing regime, in which discretion is concentrated in an inappropriate agency, and in which the benefits of this discretion are
made available only to defendants who sacrifice their constitutional
rights.
Before turning to this thesis, I want to set the stage by analyzing
the problem of sentencing reform in more traditional terms and by
separating a number of sentencing issues from one another. The
central concern of most recent discussions of sentencing has been
how much discretion criminal justice officials should have, but an
equally important question may be where sentencing discretion
should reside. This article will consider three separate decision
points in the criminal justice system-parole, the judicial determination of sentence, and prosecutorial plea negotiation. It will briefly
examine the different purposes, both legitimate and illegitimate,
that are likely to be served by vesting discretion at these distinct
points, and it will explore some functional interrelationships among
them. Because a number of recent reform proposals have apparently disregarded obvious features of our criminal justice system,
the emphasis of many of these remarks will be on the simple rather
than the sophisticated.

II.

THE DISCRETION OF PAROLE BOARDS

Of the various components of the call for sentencing reform,
academic observers have probably been most receptive to proposals
for severely restricting or eliminating the powers of parole boards.
The present extent of these powers reflects a reformative jurisprudence implemented, for the most part, in the early twentieth
century as a concomitant of the Progressive Movement.4 The
§ 1170 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
4 Address by David Rothman to the Advisory Committee of the National Insti3 CAL. ItNAL CODE,

tute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C. (Feb., 1976).
Professor Alan M. Dershowitz prepared a short history of sentencing reform in
America for the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing. He
noted that as early as 1787 Dr. Benjamin Rush proposed a system of indeterminate
sentencing in which an offender's release from prison would depend upon his
progress toward rehabilitation. Dershowitz, Background Paper, in FAm An CEaTAI

PumsmmENT, supra note 2, at 86. In 1847, S. J. May argued against judicial
sentencing on the ground that every offender should be held in prison "until the
evil disposition is removed from his heart." Id. 90. The first indeterminate sentencing law in the United States, providing a three-year sentence for "common
prostitutes" which could be terminated at any time by the inspectors of the Detroit
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asserted justification for the parole board's sentencing powers is
essentially that expert penologists, who can evaluate an offender's
conduct and his response to treatment in prison, can best determine
the appropriate moment for his release.
That I and many other academics adhered in large part to this
reformative viewpoint only a decade or so ago seems almost incredible to most of us today. To probe a person's psyche and
predict his future behavior is always an awesome task, and the
optimistic belief that one can discern a person's general propensity
for law observance from his regimented conduct in a prison now
seems remarkably naive. Although not all of us are ready simply
to abandon rehabilitation as one objective of the criminal process
(at least not in every circumstance), we have become far less
ambitious in pursuing this goal than we were a few years ago when
we encouraged our state legislatures to adopt some variation of
the Model Penal Code's sentencing scheme. Our general disillusionment with rehabilitative goals stems from both jurisprudential
and pragmatic considerations. Even if the state could achieve its
rehabilitative objectives far more often than it does, we have become
doubtful that an offender's wrongdoing justifies a broad assumption
of governmental power over his personality. Moreover, almost
every means of rehabilitating criminals has been tried, and almost
nothing seems to work.6 The sad fact is that, so far as we can tell,
most prisoners are not perfectable victims of social ills who will
respond to one kind of treatment or another. Some, an undetermined number, may draw a lesson from the unpleasant experience
of being arrested, convicted and punished; but apart from this
"specific deterrence," only two personal experiences, aging 6 and
religious conversion, seem likely to work dramatic changes in an
offender's behavior.
The principal practical effect of our emphasis on "cure" has
been to encourage convicts to view their time in prison as an exercise in theatre.7 They "volunteer" for group therapy and other
House of Correction, was enacted at the behest of Warden Zebulon R. Brockway
in 1869. Id. 95. The following year, the National Prison Congress endorsed
indeterminate sentencing with a religious fervor that persisted among prison officials
in the decades that followed. Id. 93. See D. FOGEL, supra note 2, at 1-64. Despite
some noteworthy intellectual precursors dating back at least to Dr. Rush's proposal
in the eighteenth century, the flowering of indeterminate sentencing has been a
relatively recent phenomenon.
5 See, e.g., Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 Pu. INTEREST 22 (1974).
6 E. STurnRLAND & D. CRussEy, CuMIvNOLOGY 121-26 (9th ed.
7 See N. Momius, Tm FurmE OF IMPsO NmENT (1974).
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rehabilitative programs, say the right things about the help that
they have received, and even find Christ and become guinea pigs
for medical experimentation in hypocritical efforts to curry favor
with parole boards. In addition, it has become increasingly apparent that the very indeterminacy of indeterminate sentences is a
form of psychological torture."
Even if parole boards do not effectively serve their intended
function, they are probably not utterly useless. As a statewide
agency, a parole board can sometimes exercise its power in such a
manner as to reduce the disparities in sentencing created by the
varying outlooks of local judges and prosecutors. In addition, as an
agency whose decisions are somewhat removed from local pressures
and emotions and removed in time from the adjudication of guilt, a
parole board can sometimes counteract the untoward vindictiveness
of local sentencing officials. 9 (It seems worth noting that the concept
of parole as a period of supervised release halfway between confinement and freedom can be retained even if the sentencing powers
of parole boards are eliminated. Parole release has been criticized
on the ground that it constitutes merely a gratuitous "hold" over
former prisoners rather than a meaningful aid to reintegration or
a worthwhile form of policing, 0 but if a supervised period of
transition from prison to the streets is desirable, it can become a
regular feature of every prison sentence rather than a subject of the
parole board's discretion.")
Under America's regime of guilty plea bargaining, an offender
who has exercised the right to trial is likely to receive a much more
severe sentence than an otherwise identical offender who has
pleaded guilty.' 2 The available evidence suggests that parole boards
have used their sentencing powers to reduce this disparity, albeit to
a limited extent.' 3 Reduction of the sentence differential between
guilty plea and trial defendants may be another worthwhile "inci8 See, e.g., Ramsey, Book Review, 24 STiN. L. Rsv. 965 (1972).
9 See, e.g., N. Moas, supra note 7, at 48.

10 J. MrrooED, supra note 2, at 216-27.
"See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (at the
expiration of an inmate's determinate sentence less whatever "good time" credit he
has earned, he "shall be released on parole for a period not exceeding one year,
unless the board for good cause waives parole and discharges the inmate from
custody.").
12 See, e.g., AcaSoNim=AvE OFFICE OF
E UNrrEo STATES CourTs, FEDmAL
OFF-NERms IN UNrTED STATES Dirsamr COURTs 1971, at 13 (1973) (Exhibit VII);
Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 CoLTJm. L. PEv.
1059, 1085 n.89 (1976).
13 See Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and
Parole Processes, 1 J. CRI. JuST. 27, 36-40 (1973).
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dental" function of parole boards. When the ability of parole
boards to perform this function is reduced or eliminated, the power
of bargaining prosecutors is likely to be increased. With the restriction of the parole board's discretion, a defendant who is considering whether to accept a proposed plea agreement need not
fear that parole practices may, to some extent, deprive him of the
apparent benefit of his bargain; nor can a defendant who chooses to
stand trial hope that parole practices will ameliorate the penalty
that our system of criminal justice threatens for his exercise of a
constitutional right.
Nevertheless, the practice of plea bargaining does not necessarily argue for maintaining the existing powers of parole boards,
for much depends on what becomes of those powers in a reformed
system of sentencing. The powers currently exercised by parole
boards can be assumed by legislatures or transferred to judges to be
exercised following an offender's conviction, or they can be transformed into additional levers that prosecutors may use in inducing
pleas of guilty. Prior to the recent elimination of the California
Adult Authority as part of that state's sentencing reform, the
sentencing power of that agency was so extensive that most practitioners saw little point in plea bargaining when an offender
seemed certain to be sentenced to state prison in any event. 14 Under
the new California sentencing statute, bargains affecting the length
of an offender's stay in prison will undoubtedly become commonplace. 15 Much of the Adult Authority's power will, in other words,
be transferred to the prosecutor's office.', Moreover, when the
benefits of discretion become available only through the plea
bargaining process, the concentration of abusive power in the hands
14A.schuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm.L. REv. 50,
101-03 & n.129 (1968).
15 See text accompanying notes 54-70 infra.
16 Professor Phillip E. Johnson read a draft of this paper and commented that
it was somewhat misleading to speak of the transfer of power to the prosecutor's
office. Because defense attorneys are active participants in the negotiating process,
Professor Johnson suggested that one might better refer to the enhanced power of
both the prosecutor and his adversary. Of course defense attorneys do have a
significant voice in the formulation of plea agreements. Nevertheless, after ,a
defense attorney has made his arguments and exerted whatever plea bargaining
leverage he can, a prosecutor must still determine what punishment is acceptable
to the state before entering a plea agreement. In this sense, the input provided
by the defense attorney can be viewed as one important influence on an official
sentencing decision made by the prosecutor. Professor Johnson is certainly correct
that a prosecutor's sentencing power is likely to be constrained by a variety of
circumstances, and I hope that my continued use of the term "prosecutorial power"
does not convey too imperial an image.
-I
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of a single agency is especially to be feared. I therefore turn to
proposals to restrict the discretion of trial judges.
III. JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION

The advocates of fixed and presumptive sentencing commonly
argue that judicial sentencing discretion stands on about the same
discredited footing as the discretion of parole boards. For example,
Andrew von Hirsch has written that "wide discretion in sentencing
has been sustained by the traditional assumptions about rehabilitation. and predictive restraint. Once these assumptions are abandoned, the basis for such broad discretion crumbles." 17
Unlike the discretion of parole boards, judicial sentencing discretion is not an outgrowth of the optimism of the Progressive Era.' 8
Judges have had broad sentencing powers for as long as prisons have
been used to punish and even longer. I recently discovered an old
volume of Tennessee and North Carolina statutes that contains
some illustrations, including the following provision on horse stealing enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1807:
Be it enacted, that every person who shall feloniously steal,
take and carry away, any horse, mare or gelding, the property of another person, the person so offending, shall, for
the first offense be adjudged and sentenced by the court
before whom convicted, to receive on his or her bare back,
a number of lashes, not exceeding thirty-nine, be imprisoned at the discretion of the court, not less than six
months, and not exceeding two years, shall sit in the pillory
two hours on three different days, and shall be rendered
infamous . . .and shall be branded with the letters H.T.

in such manner and on such part of his person as the court
17 A. vox HmscH, supra note 2, at 98.
I8 Professor Dershowitz concluded that penal code revisions between 1790 and
1820 "reflected the views that certainty of punishment is more important than

severity of punishment." Dershowitz, supra note 4, at 85. Yet the statute that he
cited to illustrate this proposition, a Massachusetts law on maiming enacted in 1804,
gave trial judges discretion to select any term of solitary imprisonment not exceeding
10 years. Id. 134 n.6. Professor Dershowitz also quoted a 1750 Massachusetts
statute that provided: "where there shall appear any circumstances to mitigate or
alleviate any of the offenses against this act . . . it shall and may be lawful for
the judges . . . to abate the whole of the punishment of whipping or such part
thereof as they shall judge proper."

Id. 134 n.5.

And he noted a 1676 Pennsyl-

vania law that empowered judges to sentence offenders who were unable to pay a
fine to "Corporal punishment not exceeding twenty Stripes, or do Service to Expiate

the Crime."

Id. 133 n.2.
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shall direct; and on the second conviction shall suffer death
without the benefit of clergy. 19
Even more interesting is a North Carolina statute on suborning
perjury enacted in 1777-thirteen years before the establishment of
the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, the event commonly viewed
as inaugurating the use of imprisonment as a penal sanction in
America.2 0 This statute provided that a convicted offender should
"stand in the pillory one hour, have his or her right ear nailed
thereunto, and be further punished by fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court." 21
The North Carolina legislature of 1777 would probably have
agreed with the position adopted by the California legislature two
hundred years later: "[T]he purpose of imprisonment for crime is
punishment." 22 Rather than establish a system of fixed sentences,
however, the North Carolina legislature chose the opposite extreme;
it imposed no limitations whatever upon the trial judge's power to
determine the length of an offender's confinement. This bit of
history suggests that the medical model of rehabilitation has been
neither the exclusive nor the primary impetus for the grant of
judicial sentencing discretion in America.
Simply in terms of blameworthiness or desert, criminal cases
are different from one another in ways that legislatures cannot
anticipate, and limitations of language prevent the precise description of differences that can be anticipated. One need not adopt
grandiose rehabilitative goals to think that it should sometimes
19 An Act Defining the Punishment to be Inflicted on Persons Guilty of the

Crimes and Offenses Therein Mentioned, § 4, Tenn., Dec. 3, 1807, reprinted in
1 E. Scorr, LAws OF THE STATE OF TENNEsSEE INCLuDING TosE OF NonvT
CARoLwA 1056 (1821) (emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., Cloward, Correctional Administration and Political Change, in
PRISON WrrrrN SocmTy 78, 84 (L. Hazelrigg ed. 1968). For a discussion of the
inauguration of the Walnut Street prison, see B. McKELvEy, AmymicAN PRIsoNs 2-7

(1936).
21 An Act for the Punishment of Such Persons ai Shall Procure or Commit
Any Wilful Perjury, N. Car., Apr. 8, 1777, reprinted in 1 E. Scoi-, supra note 19,
at 155-56 (emphasis added). Many of the early nineteenth century statutes included in Scott's interesting book provided for punishments such as a fine of not
less than $50 or more than $1000, imprisonment for not less than one nor more
than 12 months, and whipping "on the bare back with a whip or cow-skin, with
not less than ten nor more than thirty-nine lashes." See, e.g., 1 E. Scotr, supra
note 19, at 5, 140. Later in the nineteenth century, terms of imprisonment became
longer as state penitentiaries replaced local jails and as both capital and corporal

punishment fell into disfavor, yet broad judicial sentencing discretion remained the
norm. See, e.g., Revised Statutes of the Territory of Colorado, ch. 22, § 44 (1868)
("Every person convicted of the crime of rape, shall be punished by confinement

in the penitentiary for a term not less than one year, and such imprisonment may
extend to life").
22
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
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make a difference whether an armed robbery was committed with a
machine gun, a revolver, a baseball bat, a toy gun or a finger in the
pocket. Perhaps it should also make a difference whether the crime
was motivated by a desperate family financial situation or merely a
desire for excitement; whether the robber wielded a firearm himself or simply drove the getaway car; whether the victim of the
crime was a blind newsstand operator whom the robber did not
know or a person against whom the robber had legitimate grievances; whether the robber took five cents, $100,000 or a treasured
keepsake that the victim begged to retain; whether the crime occurred at noon on a crowded street corner or at midnight in an
alley; whether the robber walked voluntarily into a police station to
confess or desperately resisted capture; and whether the robber was
emotionally disturbed or a calculating member of an ongoing criminal organization. The principal function of judicial sentencing
discretion has probably been to permit a detailed consideration of
differences of this sort in culpability-a consideration that legislatures have historically recognized their own inability to provide.
When, in recent years, a judge has sentenced one of several cofelons to a term of probation and the others to imprisonment, he
was likely to remark that the defendant placed on probation had
exhibited greater rehabilitative potential than the others. The
judge may have meant nothing more, however, than that the
favored defendant was young, had participated in the crime in a
relatively minor way and had been induced to participate through
some beguilement on the part of his confederates; he therefore
seemed substantially less blameworthy than his fellows. Even when
our rhetoric has emphasized reformation, the dominant reality may
have been "just deserts."
In short, the varieties of human behavior are so great that a
legislative definition of crime must usually encompass acts of substantially different culpability. Even more importantly, the personal characteristics of offenders may remain as significant in a
sentencing regime based on desert as in a regime based in part on
the goals of rehabilitation and predictive restraint. Our past
optimism concerning criminal justice issues apparently accorded
with our view of history as progress and of America as the newfound
land: "Did someone rob a bank? If so, this person must never have
had a chance. We will give him that chance. We will teach him
how to be a welder, and he will not rob banks any more." Recently, however, the experiences of Vietnam, Watergate and, in the
criminal justice area, studies that demonstrate the naivet6 of our
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earlier rehabilitative ambitions have diminished our buoyancy.
Some Americans have apparently become weary and disillusioned
in general and, in particular, tired of thinking of offenders as individuals. Although a corrective for the undue optimism of the past
is undoubtedly in order, the corrective may be carried too far. We
may find ourselves thinking: "Don't tell us that 'a robber was retarded. We don't care about his problems. We don't know what
to do about his problems, and we are no longer interested in listening to a criminal's sob stories. The most important thing about
this robber is simply that he is a robber. He committed the same
crime as Bonnie and Clyde." Should this sort of sentiment prevail,
we will almost certainly have lost something, not in terms of the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system, but as human beings.
One need not know what to do about an offender's problems in
order to regard those problems as highly relevant to the punishment
that he should receive.
Sentencing reformers typically object to the instrumental use
of human beings to accomplish generalized social objectives. 23

It

seems to them more consistent with individual dignity to punish an
offender because he "deserves" it than to punish him for the sake of
society at large. Nevertheless, treating defendants of differing degrees of culpability alike for the sake of certainty in sentencing
seems to involve greater instrumentalism than that exhibited by
our current sentencing regime. In a system of fixed or presumptive
sentencing, cases may arise in which the legislative "tariff" will prove
unjust, but the reformers do not seem to worry very much about
this problem. Their attitude apparently is that one who commits a
crime must always expect to pay the price. This offender's punishment may be deserved only in the sense that it was specified in
advance. Nevertheless, "the law must keep its promises." 24
The intellectual progenitor of today's fixed-sentencing movement, Cesare Beccaria, wrote in 1764 that "crimes are only to be
measured by the injury done to society. They err, therefore, who
imagine that a crime is greater, or less, according to the intention
of the person by whom it is committed...
," 25 If one were to
adhere to Beccaria's remarkably primitive concept of blame, the
formulation of a workable fixed-sentencing scheme might not be
too difficult a task. Reformers in the last quarter of the twentieth
23 See SmucciL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 145-50; A. voN HmscH,supra
note 2, at 66-67.
24 1 HoLMEs-LAsKi Lrnr-rs 806 (M. Howe, ed. 1953).
25 C. BEccA A, AN EssAY oN Cnarms AND PumsHmENr 26 (London 1767).
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century, however, have not been so inhumane. As von Hirsch has
observed, "[The seriousness of the crime] depends both on the harm
done (or risked) by the act and on the degree of the actor's culpability." 28 It is noteworthy that Beccaria himself recognized that
a consideration of factors other than social harm would require
individualized sentencing: "[I]t would be necessary to form, not
only a particular code for every individual, but a new penal law
for every crime." 27
Most of today's reformers recognize the need for some small
amount of judicial discretion to take account of variations in culpability within single offense categories. Their proposals typically
provide for variations of plus-or-minus twenty percent or plus-orminus one year in the presumptive prison sentence for each
offense. 2s A basic question is, of course, whether this limited degree
of flexibility is enough. 29 In addition, California's recently revised
penal code leaves the most important component of the sentencing
decision-the choice between prison and probation-to the same
26 A. VON HiRscH, supra note 2, at
27

69.

C.BECCARIA, supra note 25, at 27.

28 See, e.g., A. voN HmscH, supra note 2, at 98-101.

29 Fixed and presumptive sentencing schemes have focused primarily on the
sentence to be imposed for a single crime. Before being apprehended, however,
an offender commonly will have committed 5 armed robberies, or will have made
150 fraudulent entries in his employer's books, or will have sold 1000 counterfeit
lottery tickets. To multiply a legislatively fixed or presumptive sentence 5 or 150
or 1000 times in these situations would be manifestly unjust, yet to disregard the
defendant's "additional" crimes seems at least equally improper. None of today's
reformers have devised a non-discretionary formula for weighing multiple crimes
that appears equitable in all situations.
The approach taken in the new California statute toward this problem is better
than most. When a judge imposes consecutive sentences for multiple felonies, the
aggregate sentence is limited to "the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the
judge for any of the crimes, including any enhancements . . . plus one-third of
the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony convictions for
which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed without such enhancements."
CAL. INrAL CODE § 1170.1a(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition, the aggregate sentence imposed for crimes other than the "base" offense cannot exceed five
years. Id. § 1170.1a(e). The decision whether to impose consecutive sentences,
however, is left to the judge's discretion. In multiple-crime situations, this discretion
seems necessary, and indeed, more discretion might well be desirable.
Of course, under the new California statute, additional crimes can lead to
additional punishment only when they are alleged and proven; neither the trial
judge nor correctional authorities can take additional crimes into account informally
to any great extent in determining the sentence for a single offense. Although this
reform will promote procedural fairness in sentencing, it may, in some instances,
lead to more complicated trials. In the past, a prosecutor might have decided to
charge only a few offenses in a particular case, knowing that conviction of these
offenses would give the sentencing authority sufficient power to punish uncharged
offenses as well.
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lawless discretion as in the past.30 The seemingly ludicrous result
is that a judge may have an unfettered choice between probation
and a specified prison term but no power to impose an intermediate
punishment. Whatever the logic of their demands for certainty,
some liberal reformers appear unwilling to advocate the "mandatory minimum sentences" that they have previously condemned,
and reluctant to take any step that obviously will disadvantage defendants. Hence their proposals retain probation on the same discretionary terms as in the past.
Some of today's reformers also recognize that a more precise
definition of substantive crimes will be necessary before a scheme
of presumptive sentencing can be fair, and the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing has drafted an "illustrative presumptive sentencing statute for armed robbery" to demonstrate the feasibility of the task.3 ' The statute seems, however, to
demonstrate the reverse. It divides the crime of armed robbery
into six degrees and yet takes account of only two variables-the sort
of weapon used and the amount of physical violence threatened.
Even the attempt to rationalize these two variables is somewhat
crude; for example, robbery with a machine gun is treated no differently from robbery with a .22 caliber target pistol.2 More
importantly, variables such as the amount of money taken, the
number and character of the victims, the motivation for the crime,
and any special disabilities of the offender are relegated to a list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that may sometimes justify
a departure from the presumptive sentence. 33
The Task Force's effort to provide an "exclusive" list of aggravating and mitigating factors is itself troublesome. For example,
under the Task Force proposal, a judge would apparently be expected to disregard the fact that a particular offender was seized
with remorse, turned himself in, and provided information that led
to the arrest and conviction of a half-dozen violent criminals. Perhaps the Task Force did not make a focused decision that this sort
of post-crime conduct is irrelevant to the punishment that an
offender should receive. The authors may have given the issue
little thought, and therein lies the danger of attempting to specify
30
The new statute does direct the California Judicial Council to adopt rules
to promote uniformity in the grant or denial of probation as well as to promote
uniformity in resolving other sentencing problems, such as whether to impose the
minimum or maximum prison term or consecutive or concurrent sentences. Id.
§ 1170.3.
31 FAm AN CRTA IN Puusmx'r,
supra note 2, at 37-53.
32 Id. 38.
33 Id. 43-45.
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all relevant sentencing factors in advance. 34 More importantly, a
list of unweighted aggravating and mitigating factors does little to
confine judicial discretion. If every significant variable were
domesticated in the same manner that the draft domesticates a few,
and if each variable were then cross-tabulated with every other
variable, the resulting armed robbery statute would probably exhibit about the same degree of prolixity as an entire penal code
today. Armed robbery in the 161st degree might be the taking of
property worth between ten and fifty dollars from a single victim
without special vulnerabilities by a mentally retarded offender acting alone and using a loaded firearm. 35
A more promising approach is currently being developed by
Leslie Wilkins, Jack Kress and their associates in the City of Denver
and in the State of Vermont,30 and by Judge Sam Callan and the
other criminal court judges in El Paso, Texas.3 7 In essence, these
34
Additional illustrations of this danger are provided by the "guided discretion" capital punishment statutes favored by the Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976), and its companion cases. A defendant convicted of capital murder might wish to make the following speech to the jury before
it considered whether capital punishment should be imposed: "I am deeply sorry
for my crime, which I recognize was about as bad as any that can be imagined.
I did, in fact, go to the police station shortly after the killing to surrender and
make a full confession. Although I have done some terrible things in my life, you
may wish to know, before deciding whether I should live or die, that I have also
done some good. I once risked my life in combat to save five comrades-an action
for which I was awarded the Silver Star-and for the past 10 years I have personally cared for my invalid mother while supporting five younger brothers and
sisters." The "mitigating factors" listed in today's capital punishment statutes are
sometimes quite general, but none that I have seen would permit a jury to consider
any of the circumstances mentioned in this defendant's speech (or, for that matter,
any other evidence of pre-crime virtue or post-crime remorse).
Certainly the
Florida statute upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 n.6 (1976), would
not; yet the Supreme Court plurality, seemingly oblivious to the statutes limitations,
declared in a companion case that "[a] jury must be allowed to consider on the
basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed,
but also why it should not be imposed." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976);
see Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977) (per curiam) (mandatory death
penalty for murder of fireman or law enforcement officer unconstitutional-jury must
be able to consider mitigating factors).
35
In addition to its illustrative armed robbery statute, the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force provided a brief description of how it might treat a number of
other crimes. For a forceful dissection of this description, see Zimring, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform, 6 HASTINGS
CETR REIo'RT, 15-16 (1976).
36 See L. WIaNs, J. KEss, D. GOTTFnEDSON, J. CALPM & A. GELMAN,
SF.NrrENuN Gummmsms: STRUtCTUIUNG JfUicuL DiscnaRMON (1976) [hereinafter
cited as SENTENCLNG GUIDELNES].
37 See Memorandum to Members of the El Paso County Bar from judges of
the Criminal District Courts (Dec. 16, 1975) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). The El Paso "point system for sentencing" is substantially
less sophisticated than that which Wilkins, Kress and their associates are developing.
SENTENCING GurEuvrEs, supra note 36. Without the aid of a computer, an LEAA
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scholars and court officials have been working to evolve a "point
system" under which a sentencing judge would assign values to a
number of recurring sentencing factors in the cases that come before
him. When an offender has been convicted of a class 2 felony
under the local penal code, for example, the judge might start with
a base score of six points. Then he might add two points because
the offender carried a firearm during the crime, add another two
points because he fired this weapon, add still another point because
the offender was convicted of a serious misdemeanor within the
past year, subtract two points because the offender cooperated in the
prosecution of other offenders, and so on. The final score would
be translated into a presumptive sentence which the judge could disregard (and not just within a limited range of plus-o-minus twenty
percent or plus-or-minus one year), provided he articulated his
reasons for doing so. Another worthwhile approach is incorporated
in S. 1437, the compromise proposal for a revised federal criminal
code introduced by Senators McClellan and Kennedy. 38 This apgrant, or a detailed study of past sentencing practices, Judge Callan devised it one
day while sitting in a bathtub. El Paso's sentencing reform is especially interesting,
however, because the district court judges coupled it with a prohibition of prosecutorial plea bargaining-a prohibition that seems to have been entirely effective.
38 S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The bill would create a United
States Sentencing Commission and direct it to prescribe a "suggested sentencing
range . . . for each category of offense involving each category of defendant."
The bill also enumerates the factors to be considered by a court in imposing a
sentence:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(B) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
(C) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner;
(3) the sentencing range established for the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the [United States]
Sentencing Commission [which would be established pursuant to S. 181,
95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977)] and that are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; and
(4) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission
* , * that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.
Id. § 2003(a).
The court, "at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for
its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence is outside the range
described in subsection [20031(a)(3), the specific reason for the imposition of a
sentence outside such range." Id. §2003(b). A sentence imposed outside the
range established by the Sentencing Commission would ordinarily be subject to
appellate review. Id. §§ 3725(a) & (b).
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proach, when fully developed, promises to combine substantial
guidance for sentencing judges with the flexibility needed to treat
different cases differently.
The development of sentencing guidelines of this sort is worthwhile but is probably insufficient. A narrowing of the range of
statutory penalties, coupled in some instances with a more precise
definition of substantive offenses, would be desirable in virtually
every American jurisdiction. Although I have emphasized that
discretion has its uses even in a sentencing regime based on just
desert, discretion also has a darker side. Whenever discretion is
granted, it will be abused. In some instances, individual differences in culpability will be less important than differences in race,
class, lifestyle and other irrelevancies. Even when officials consider
only what they should, moreover, they will do so in differing ways,
and troublesome inequalities will result. Despite my criticism of
fixed sentencing proposals, the question today is probably how much
we should move in the direction of fixed sentences, not whether we
should do so.
IV. PROSECUTORiAL PLEA BARGAINING

Any reform of sentencing practices, whether great or small and
whether taking the form of fixed sentences, presumptive sentences
or sentencing guidelines, can be undercut by the practice of plea
bargaining. The advocates of dramatic change in our system of
criminal punishment have dutifully noted that prosecutors do, in
effect, make sentencing decisions in formulating charges 39 and in
negotiating pleas of guilty. They have even proclaimed that "there
can be no practical understanding of any sentencing system without
an appreciation of the role played by plea bargaining." 40 Sometimes after these brief glances in the direction of reality, however,
39 See, e.g., voN Hmsc, supra note 2, at 104-05. In practice, the initial
formulation of charges by a prosecutor's office is a substantially less important component of the sentencing process than plea bargaining. Indeed, prosecutors may
generally exercise too little sentencing discretion at the charge formulation stage
rather than too much. One vice of the plea bargaining system is that it encourages
prosecutors mechanically to charge defendants with "the highest and the most" at
the outset and to withhold the exercise of any equitable discretion until they can
receive something in return. Of course this analysis refers only to the formulation
of charges in cases that prosecutors have tentatively decided to pursue to conviction. Prosecutorial "diversion," like plea bargaining, is commonly a device for
securing a restriction of liberty without the bother and expense of a trial, and this
form of prosecutorial sentencing should be analyzed in similar terms. See Goldberg,

Pre-TrialDiversion: Bilk or Bargain?, 31 NLADA BnsisCAsE 490 (1973).
40 Dershowitz, supra note 4, at 81.
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and sometimes without them,41 the reformers have for the most
part ignored the dominant reality of prosecutorial sentencing power.
They have usually sought to leave this power as they found it
without pausing to consider the effects of a still-unchecked power
to bargain on the achievement of their objectives.
It seems unlikely that today's reformers are truly content with
the regime of prosecutorial power as it is. There is hardly any
objection to judicial sentencing discretion that does not apply in
full measure to prosecutorial sentencing discretion-a discretion
which has been, in practice, every bit as broad and broader. 42 As
much as judicial discretion, the discretion of American prosecutors
lends itself to inequalities and disparities of treatment because of
disagreements concerning issues of sentencing policy. Like judicial
discretion, prosecutorial discretion permits at least the occasional
dominance of illegitimate considerations such as race and personal
or political influence in sentencing decisions. It may also lead to
a general perception of unfairness, arbitrariness and uncertainty and
may even undercut the deterrent force of the criminal law.
There are additional objections to prosecutorial sentencing
discretion that do not apply with nearly so much force to judicial
discretion. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is more frequently made contingent upon a waiver of constitutional rights. It
is generally exercised less openly. It is more likely to be influenced by considerations of friendship nd by reciprocal favors of a
dubious character. It is commonly exercised for the purpose of
obtaining convictions in cases in which guilt could not be proven
at trial. It is usually exercised by people of less experience and
less objectivity than judges. It is commonly exercised on the basis
of less information than judges possess. Indeed, its exercise may
depend less upon considerations of desert, deterrence and reformation than upon a desire to avoid the hard work of preparing and
trying cases. In short, prosecutorial discretion has the same faults
as judicial discretion and more.
The laissez-faire attitude of sentencing reformers toward this
concentration of governmental power in prosecutors' offices is prob4
1Judge Frankel, for example, noted that "the great majority (ranging in
some jurisdictions to around 90 percent) of those formally charged with crimes
plead guilty," M. FnANoxL, supra note 2, at vii, but he did not examine the bargaining process that lies behind this lopsided figure and its substantial impact on
sentencing.
42 A trial judge's sentencing discretion is ordinarily limited by the range of
penalties that the legislature has provided for a particular offense, but a prosecutor
who is dissatisfied with the range of penalties authorized for one offense can frequently use his charging power to substitute another.
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ably not the product of blindness or indifference. It is probably
best explained by a pervasive sense that, for one reason or another,
the institution of plea bargaining is impregnable. Perhaps the
reformers have accepted the claim that trial courts would be
swamped if the power of prosecutors to bargain for guilty pleas were
substantially restricted, or they may have agreed that efforts to
restrict the bargaining process would merely drive it underground.
Furthermore, the reformers probably have little desire to engage in
what they see as a fruitless political battle. They may sense that
sentencing reform will have a rough enough time in the political
arena without a hopeless charge at the prosecutor's well-entrenched
-and very comfortable-way of doing business. The Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force put it this way: "The propriety of plea
bargaining-whether it is desirable to eliminate it, if this is a practical possibility-will continue to be debated. But sentencing
reform cannot be held in abeyance until the debate is resolved, if
it ever is." 43 In other words, discussions of plea bargaining may
be interesting, but we have the world's work to do.
I am not at all persuaded that our society is too impoverished
to give its criminal defendants their day in court. Most nations of
the world, including many far poorer than ours, manage to resolve
their criminal cases without plea bargaining. 4 Nor do I accept the
"boys-will-be-boys" theory that plea bargaining is inevitable, a theory
that depends on the cynical view that prosecutors and defense attorneys will work to undercut even a clear and authoritative legal
condemnation of bargaining in its various forms. Moreover, I
believe that the political battle could be won if those who recognize
the injustice of our current regime of prosecutorial power would
simply fight the fight. The only public opinion polls on plea bargaining of which I am aware report that an overwhelming and
growing majority oppose the practice.45 Nevertheless, I shall not
pursue these issues in this article. Rather, I shall contend that if
the reformers are correct-if the practice of plea bargaining is indeed invulnerable-this circumstance argues strongly against the
reformers' proposals. The asserted resiliency of plea bargaining
militates as forcefully against the various changes that the reformers
43

FAR AND CERTAN PuNisHMENT, supra note 2, at 26-27.
44 See, e.g., Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41
U. Cm. L. Rlv. 439 (1974); Myhre, Conviction Without Trial in the United States
and Norway: A Comparison, 5 Hous. L. REv. 647 (1968).
45D. For E, supra note 2, app. I, at 300 (polls in Michigan by Market
Opinion Research in 1973, 1974 & 1975--in 1975: 70%disapproval; 21% approval;
9% "don't know").
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seek as it does against the changes that they have foregone. Indeed,
from my perspective, the worthwhile goal of sentencing reform
might almost as well be forgotten if plea bargaining cannot be
restricted.
The reformers themselves, of course, do not see it this way.
They vaguely argue that their proposals would rationalize the plea
bargaining process, and some of them also suggest-usually in
private-that these proposals might constitute the first step toward
a more substantial restriction of prosecutorial sentencing power.
One must always start somewhere, they maintain, and not necessarily with the most pernicious manifestation of the evil.
Consider, however, a criminal code in which offenses have been
defined in great detail and in which the legislature has attached a
single fixed sentence to each offense. Suppose, in other words, that
not an ounce of discretion remains in the hands of trial judges and
parole boards, and then suppose that prosecutors retain an unchecked power to substitute one charge for another in the plea
bargaining process. It seems doubtful that even Ray Bradbury or
Franz Kafka could devise a more bizarre system of criminal justice
than this one. Despite the reformers' talk of certainty, the lawlessness of our system of criminal justice would probably not be reduced under this regime. The continuation of plea bargaining
would produce the same disparity of outcomes, the same racism and
classism, the same gamesmanship, and the same uncertainty that
plague the present system. The unchecked discretion over sentencing that has apparently distinguished our nation from all others
would continue, but it would reside, not just predominantly but
exclusively, in the prosecutor's office. The benefits of this discretion
would, moreover, usually be available only to defendants who
sacrificed their right to trial, and the pressure to plead guilty would
therefore be likely to increase. We would have abandoned our old
discretionary regime-a regime in which mercy could be given-and
substituted a new discretionary regime in which mercy would only
be sold.
The defenders of plea bargaining sometimes debate whether
the bargaining process should focus on the number and severity of
the charges against a defendant or instead on specific sentence
recommendations.4 6 Plea bargaining in a world of fixed sentencing,
however, would combine the worst features of both forms of
negotiation. Under the current system of criminal justice, the
principal advantage of charge bargaining is that it involves a
46

See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1136-46.
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measure of shared discretion and tends to intrude less dramatically
upon the judicial sentencing function. Even after a charge-reduction bargain has been fully effected, a trial judge is likely to retain
a significant choice in the sentence to be imposed, and he may
exercise this discretion without undercutting the credibility of the
prosecutor who struck the bargain. When plea negotiations focus
on prosecutorial sentence recommendations, by contrast, judges
usually follow the course of least resistance and simply ratify the
prosecutors' sentencing decisions. 4 7 The advantage that charge
bargaining exhibits in our current system of criminal justice would
plainly disappear in a system of fixed sentences. Under a fixedsentencing regime, bargaining about the charge would be bargaining
about the sentence. A nonjudicial officer would determine the
exact outcome of every guilty plea case, and every defendant who
secured an offer from a prosecutor in the plea bargaining process
would be informed of the precise sentence that would result from
his conviction at trial and also of the precise lesser sentence that
would result from his conviction by plea.48
Although plea negotiation in a system of fixed sentencing would
not have the same advantages as charge bargaining today, it would
retain the same defects. The principal virtue of sentence-recommendation bargaining in our current system of justice is that it
permits a reasonably precise adjustment of the concessions that a
defendant will receive by pleading guilty. Charge bargaining is not
as capable of making fine adjustments but must proceed by leaps
from one charge to another. In one case, an agreement to substitute
the next available lesser offense for the offense that has been charged
may result in a conviction for only a slightly less serious felony. In
another case, "going down to count two" may result in a misdemeanor conviction. In still another case, there may be no lesser
offense that seems at all related to the defendant's conduct. A
prosecutor may often be forced to choose between withholding any
concession and granting one that seems too generous, and he may
47 Id.
4

1063-67.

This form of bargaining would be even more explicit, and even less subject
to judicial review, than today's sentence bargaining. A defendant who is offered
a specific sentence recommendation today in exchange for a plea of guilty can
usually be almost certain that the recommended sentence will be imposed, but
there remains some chance that the trial judge will reject the prosecutor's proposal.
Moreover, the sentence that would follow a conviction at trial is rarely made explicit
in sentence bargaining today. The greater explicitness of the plea bargaining
process in a system of fixed sentencing would, of course, have its advantages, particularly in terms of letting each defendant know the consequences of his choice of
plea, but it would make the coercion inherent in the guilty plea system all the
more apparent.
8
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sometimes find that the draftsmen of his state's penal code have
failed to provide a lesser offense that he can properly substitute for
the offense initially charged. Because plea bargaining in a system
of fixed sentencing would similarly require the substitution of one
charge for another, accidents of spacing in the drafting of penal
codes would assume substantial importance. In addition, prosecutors would be subject to the same temptations for overcharging
that they face in systems of charge bargaining today, and criminal
conduct would be mislabeled as defendants pleaded guilty to offenses
less serious than those that they apparently committed.4 9
In short, a system of fixed sentencing would not "rationalize"
the plea bargaining process. Not only would plea negotiation
assume a greater importance in this system than in our current
sentencing regime, but this negotiation would take an even less
desirable form-a form that would exhibit neither the shared discretion of today's charge bargaining nor the flexibility and accuracy
in the labeling of offenses of today's sentence bargaining. Plea
bargaining would probably become more frequent; its effect would
be more conclusive; and it would be bargaining of about the least
desirable type.
Of course I have spoken in terms of a simplified model-a
"pure" fixed-sentencing system that none of today's reformers, to
my knowledge, have advocated. The evaluation of detailed "real
world" proposals is more complicated and the prediction of results
more perilous. For one thing, many of today's reformers couple
their proposals for increased certainty in sentencing with proposals
for a substantial reduction in the severity of criminal punishments5 0
49

See Alsehuler, supra note 12, at 1136-46.

For a discussion of convictions

resulting from the inaccurate substitution of lesser offenses, see Barkai, Accuracy
Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent
Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. Ev. 88 (1977).
50 Von Hirsch, for example, recommends adoption of "a [sentencing] scale
whose highest penalty (save, perhaps, for the offense of murder) is five yearswith sparing use made of sentences of imprisonment for more than three years."

A. voN Hmscia, supra note 2, at 136 (footnotes omitted). At least in an aggravated
murder case involving an Eichmann, a Speck, or a Manson, the public will undoubtedly insist-as I confess that I think it should-on the power to hold the
offender in prison for the rest of his life. If life sentences have an appropriate
place in a scheme of penalties for murder, it may attach too much importance to
the results of criminal conduct (for example, whether an offender has killed or
merely rendered his victim a comatose "vegetable") to limit the penalty for all
other crimes to five years' imprisonment.

Von Hirsch's proposal suggests another possible defect of fixed-sentencing
schemes, for it would make warning and unconditional release the prescribed penalty

for the least serious offenses. Id. 137. So minimal a penalty may be appropriate
in many cases, but whether it should be advertised in advance as the only possible
sanction for certain crimes is a somewhat different question. Presumably behavior
should not be made criminal at all unless it involves a significant departure from
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To the extent that the reformers accomplish this second objective,
the plea bargaining leverage of prosecutors is likely to be reduced.
A prosecutor who can threaten only a penalty of three years following a defendant's conviction at trial plainly has less bargaining
power than a prosecutor who can threaten a sentence of tnventy-five
years.51 Nevertheless, a caveat of Professor Franklin Zimring is
worth repeating: "Once a determinate sentencing bill is before a
legislative body, it takes only an eraser and pencil to make a oneyear 'presumptive sentence' into a six-year sentence for the same
offense." 52 Political forces may push sentencing reform away from
the humanitarian objectives of its authors and toward a sterner
model. Even if liberal reformers were to succeed initially in securing a reduction in penalties, instances in which a legislatively
specified penalty appeared too lenient would probably attract more
public attention than cases in which the penalty appeared too
severe. Politicians pressed to find issues upon which to campaign
can always propose an increase in the penalty for whatever crime
3
has caught the public's eye.5
community standards of morality, and when an offender knows that he does not
risk even so much as a fine if apprehended, he may conclude that he has a "license"
to engage in criminal behavior. A degree of uncertainty concerning the community
response to crime may have deterrent value, and although the sanctions that society
threatens as well as those that it imposes should be limited by considerations of
just desert, it does not seem inconsistent with this principle to bark a bit harder
than we will probably want to bite in the "typical" case.
51 Id. 104-05. In one sense, prosecutorial power may also be restricted when
a fixed or presumptive sentencing scheme does not reduce the aggregate severity
of criminal penalties but merely "evens out disparities" by limiting departures from
a previously established "norm." This sort of sentencing scheme should be viewed
as having two components with countervailing effects. First, by limiting the ability
of prosecutors to threaten unusually harsh, "exemplary" penalties for defendants
who stand trial the scheme would reduce the prosecutors' bargaining power. Second,
by effectively mandating minimum sentences for offenses, the scheme would give
prosecutors the kind of bargaining leverage commonly observed today when
mandatory penalties have been enacted.
5
2Zimring, supra note 35, at 17.
53 This danger cannot necessarily be eliminated by assigning the task of setting
presumptive sentences to a commission or other non-legislative body. Cf. S. 1437,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Once a commission has established a seemingly lenient
presumptive sentence for a particular offense, the pressure for legislative revision is
likely to be much greater than when the legislature has established a broad range
of sentences for that offense and when judges have imposed a variety of sentences
within this range (even if the average judicial sentence is every bit as lenient as
the presumptive sentence that a commission would approve).
Of course our system of discretionary sentencing cannot reasonably be defended
on the ground that it enables criminal justice officials to fool most of the people
most of the time. If the popular will favors more severe sentences than judges in
fact impose, the popular will should probably prevail. Nevertheless, the imperfections of the democratic process seem especially pronounced in the criminal justice
area, and I suspect that the popular will is sometimes misperceived. In the course
of working on a state penal code revision, for example, I was struck by the manner
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Individual prosecutors may, of course, respond to legislative
sentencing reform in different ways. Even when their bargaining
powers are unrestricted, some prosecutors may sense that the exercise of these powers would be inconsistent with the legislature's
desire for certainty. These prosecutors might try to "play it
straight"; if the legislature thought that a person with one prior
felony conviction who stabbed another person in the shoulder deserved a four-year prison sentence, they might refuse to undercut
this democratic judgment by "omitting the prior conviction" in
exchange for a plea of guilty. Other prosecutors, however, might
take a more flexible view, and county-by-county variations (or disparities) might result.
The recently-enacted California sentencing statute " illustrates
the expansion of prosecutorial power that sentencing reform may
in which "liberal" proposals were abandoned or defeated although almost no one
seemed to oppose them on the merits. The first modification of a proposal was
likely to occur when it was presented to a reporters' group composed primarily of
academics. Some reporters would explain that they favored the proposal as drafted
but that the state bar committee on the revision of the penal code would not, and
that it was necessary to be "realistic." The proposal would be further modified by
the state bar committee on the ground that, although most committee members
favored it, the board of directors of the state bar would not. Then the board of
directors would repeat the process, noting that the proposal could not be "sold" to
the legislature in its current form. Finally, individual legislators would explain
that they had no personal quarrel with the draft submitted by the state bar but
that it would be unacceptable to their constituents. In talking with a constituent
or two, however, I usually found that they favored the proposal as it had first been
presented to the reporters' group.
Apart from the general tendency to perceive the rest of the world as less
progressive than ourselves, there is a difference between making sentencing decisions
"in the large" and making them "in the specific." People may sound vindictive in
conversations about criminal justice issues with pollsters (a phenomenon that may
be attributable in part to the kind of leadership that politicians often provide in
this area), yet the same people may act with decency and compassion when confronted with specific cases. In El Paso, Texas, a few years ago, the district
attorney's office announced a policy of opposing probated sentences in burglary
cases, even those involving first offenders. The district attorney had apparently
concluded that this policy would be popular, and indeed it probably was. After
some resistance, El Paso's district judges decided that they could not withstand the
political pressure exerted by the district attorney's office, and as a result, virtually
all burglary defendants exercised the option of being sentenced by juries. Interviews with members of the El Paso legal community revealed that in more than
90% of all first-offense burglary cases, juries-composed of people who may well
have nodded their general approval of the district attorney's policy when they read
about it in the newspapers-awarded probated sentences.
This analysis does not suggest that if popular sentiment truly favors tougher
sentences, that sentiment should be defeated through manipulation or deception.
It does suggest that "the people" themselves and their representatives should consider whether sentencing decisions are not best made "in the specific." It is consistent with democratic values for popularly elected legislatures, and for the public,
to recognize the dangers of excessive severity that are likely to arise when sentencing
decisions are made "in the large."
54 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
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bring. In the main, this statute creates a bargainer's paradise. It
authorizes extended prison terms for offenders who have been previously sentenced to prison for other crimes,55 for offenders who were
armed or who used firearms during the commission of their
crimes,r6 for offenders who deprived their victims of extraordinarily
large amounts of property,57 and for offenders who inflicted great
personal injury while committing their crimes.-5 In each instance,
a prosecutor can apparently foreclose the additional punishment
simply by failing to allege the relevant aggravating circumstance,
and the prosecutor's decision can, of course, become the subject of
a trade. The principal practical use of habitual offender and similar statutory provisions for enhanced punishment in most states
has, in fact, been to provide plea bargaining leverage; these provisions are very rarely invoked except when defendants have asserted
the right to trial.
In addition, although the California statute commonly authorizes sentences for felonies within a three-year range, the trial judge
is not authorized to select the most severe sentence unless the prosecutor has filed a motion alleging some aggravating circumstance
(not a circumstance specified by the statute but any aggravating
circumstance that strikes the prosecutor's fancy).59 Whether such
a motion will be filed seems likely to become a frequent topic of
discussion during plea negotiations, and of course a prosecutor can
also agree not to oppose a defense attorney's efforts to obtain the
least severe of the authorized terms. (A prosecutor might, indeed,
add some sweetener to a bargain by agreeing to file a motion in
mitigation of the defendant's punishment himself.) As I have
noted, bargains for an award of probation are not limited by the
new California statute. 0° Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the statute does not restrict the prosecutor's ability to substitute
one charge for another in the plea bargaining process. Under this
statute, some of the powers formerly exercised by the California
Adult Authority have been assumed by the legislature through its
narrowing of the range of authorized penalties, and judges also
55 Id. §667.5.
56 Id. §§ 12022 to 12022.5.

§ 12022.6.
58 Id. § 12022.7.
57 Id.

059
Id.
60 See

cn1170(b).
text accompanying note 30 supra.
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have slightly greater powers than in the past.0 ' The big winners,
however, are the prosecutors.
The California statute, like most of today's reform proposals,
does exhibit some countervailing tendencies. For example, prior to
the enactment of this statute, the reduction of a first-degree murder charge to second-degree murder in California did not deprive
the Adult Authority of the power to hold an offender in prison for
the rest of his life. 2 Under the new statute, a reduction from
first- to second-degree murder will make the difference between a
sentence of death or life imprisonment (with or without the possibility of parole) and a term of five, six or seven years.6 3 The
value of a charge reduction to second-degree murder may thus have
been increased and the prosecutor's bargaining leverage enhanced.
Under the old code, however, a prosecutor could threaten an armed
robber with a potential life sentence if he were convicted at trial.64
The offer of a probated sentence conditioned upon serving a county
jail term of one year or less was therefore a very powerful lever.
Under the new code, the maximum sentence for armed robbery
when no injury has been inflicted and when a weapon has not been
fired is five years (two, three or four years for the crime of robbery
itself plus an additional year for being armed) .65 When a defendant has been charged with armed robbery in California today, an
offer of probation remains remarkably coercive, but the bargaining
leverage of the past has been reduced. 66 (Note, however, that a
6- Formerly, California judges had no control whatever over the length of an
offender's penitentiary confinement. Sentences were fixed and paroles granted by
the Adult Authority. CAL. ENAL CODE § 5077 (West 1970); see Alschuler, supra
note 14, at 101.
62 See CAL. ThzA. CoDE § 190 (West 1970).

63 See id. § 190 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
64 See id. § 213 (West 1970).
65

See id. §213 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
66 The authors of the new California statute evidently determined the presumptive penalties for particular felonies primarily by examining the amount of
time that the Adult Authority had required offenders to serve for those felonies in
the past. It might seem, therefore, that a reduction from one charge to another
should have about the same effect under the new statute as under the old. Under
the old statute, however, defendants and defense attorneys undoubtedly had less
complete knowledge of the Adult Authority's sentencing practices than they did of
the range of legislatively authorized penalties, and they probably acted more in
response to the latter than to the former. In addition, even a defendant with
detailed knowledge of the Adult Authority's practices was likely to be a "riskaverter," concerned about the danger that he might receive a more severe sentence
than the norm. Most importantly, a defendant who had been charged initially with
a more serious crime than that to which he had pleaded guilty was very likely to
be treated more severely by the Adult Authority than other defendants in the same
conviction category. See J. MrrFoRn, supra note 2, at 91 ("The Adult Authority's
official orientation bulletin states: 'The offense for which a man is committed is
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prosecutor can restore the prospect of a life sentence if he can
charge the defendant with kidnapping for the purpose of committing a robbery.0 7)
As suggested earlier, one consequence of the California Adult
Authority's broad sentencing powers was that defense attorneys
usually saw little point in plea bargaining when acceptance of the
prosecutor's best offer would lead to a state prison sentence. 68 Because California prosecutors will now be able to bargain more
specifically about the length of an offender's penitentiary confinement, the guilty-plea rate in very serious-or "automatic prison"cases will probably increase. A second consequence of the Adult
Authority's broad powers, however, was that prosecutors usually
sought ways to avoid prison sentences when felony defendants were
willing to plead guilty. Even in a relatively aggravated case, a
prosecutor was likely to offer to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor or a "wobbler" (an offense that the court could treat
either as a felony or as a misdemeanor) or to recommend an award
of probation on the condition that the defendant serve a county
jail term. Of course, a defendant who would have pleaded guilty
under the old statute in exchange for a county jail sentence followed by a term of probation may refuse to plead guilty when he
is offered only a two-year reduction in his prison term. Thus,
although the guilty-plea rate in "automatic prison" cases may increase, the guilty-plea rate in other sorts of cases may decline.
Prosecutors may, in other words, begin to offer only lesser prison
sentences in cases in which, for the sake of obtaining what was
formerly the only available sort of bargain, they would have agreed
to non-prison sentences in the past. One consequence may be an
increase-perhaps a dramatic increase-in the population of California's state prisons.
Bargaining patterns established in response to California's distinctive regime of indeterminate sentences may not change immediately with the implementation of the new sentencing law.
Perhaps the offer of county jail sentences even in rape and armed
robbery cases became common because of the perceived necessities
only one of the factors that the AA considers when making a decision.' Other
factors may be (and often are) crimes for which the prisoner was arrested but
never brought to trial .... ."); Alschuler, supra note 14, at 96 ("San Francisco
defense attorney Benjamin M. Davis adds, 'All the charges against a defendant may
be dismissed except one. But if the defendant is sentenced to the penitentiary and
comes before the Adult Authority, those super-judges will want to know all about
the ten robberies.'").
67 CAL. pENAL CODE: § 209(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
68 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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of the plea bargaining process when the Adult Authority reigned
supreme. Nevertheless, the view that this sort of offer is appropriate
may now have become internalized. Prosecutors may have persuaded themselves that their offers of county jail time in serious
felony cases are just, or they may simply not pause to reconsider
their established methods of inducing guilty pleas merely because
the new statute has been enacted. Under the new law, however,
prosecutors will gain the power to make "intermediate" offers of
relatively short prison sentences, and with the use of this newfound
power, the extraordinarily favorable (and extraordinarily coercive)
offers of the past may gradually become less frequent.
Although Chief Justice Burger has suggested that legislation
affecting the work of the courts ought to be accompanied by a
"court impact statement," 69 the preparation of such a statement
for California's new sentencing law and for most other reform
proposals is beyond my competence. There will be pulls in different directions, and much will depend upon the idiosyncratic responses of individual prosecutors in what will remain a highly
discretionary regime. The persistence of unchecked prosecutorial
power itself, however, is a dominant and probably fatal aspect of
the California reform. In California as elsewhere, the proponents
of sweeping change in our sentencing laws have ignored the ways
in which our system of criminal justice is a system.70
Of course, in terms of accomplishing its ends, the system of
criminal justice is sometimes not much of a system at all; the allegation that ours is a non-system whose left hand does not know or care
what its right hand is doing may be very often accurate. In terms
of protecting its bureaucratic methods of processing criminal cases,
however, the American system of criminal justice is indeed a system,
and the effect of suppressing an injustice at one point in the criminal process may be to cause a comparable injustice to appear else69

Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1050

(1972); see Burger, Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar
Association, 63 A.B.A.J. 504, 505 (1977).
70 At the conference at which this Article was initially presented, Professor
Raymond I. Parnas, one of the principal authors of the new California statute,

protested that he and his colleagues had indeed considered the relationship between
the statute and prosecutorial sentencing power. Professor Parnas did not, however,
deny that the California statute would substantially augment the bargaining power

of prosecutors, nor did he argue that this enhanced prosecutorial power was either
desirable or consistent with the statutes objectives.

By contrast, D. Lowell Jensen,

the District Attorney of Alameda County, did argue that enhanced prosecutorial
discretion was desirable. He observed that many prosecutors had supported enactment of the California statute for exactly that reason.
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where. 71 Reform of our amorphous regime of criminal justice is
not impossible, but it is feasible only if one begins with a will to
see it through. Without this commitment, the principal effect of
sentencing reform will be to push the evils of excessive discretion
toward an instrument of easy accommodation, the practice of plea
bargaining.
Plea bargaining can be retained in a system of fixed or presumptive sentencing without undercutting the objectives of reformers, but only if its form is substantially altered. In place of the
prosecutor's sentencing power, the legislature must specify the reward that will follow the entry of a plea of guilty. Just as a
sentencing statute can treat the carrying of a firearm while committing a crime as an aggravating factor leading to an additional
year's imprisonment, it can treat the entry of a plea of guilty as a
mitigating factor leading to a specified reduction in penalty.7 2
Under such a statute, coupled, of course, with the elimination of
plea bargaining by prosecutors, the "break" that follows the entry
of a guilty plea would not depend upon the prosecutor's whim.
The extent of this "break" would not be affected by a prosecutor's
feelings of friendship for particular defense attorneys, by his desire
to go home early on an especially busy day, by his apparent inability
to establish a defendant's guilt at trial, by his (or the trial judge's)
unusually vindictive attitude toward a defendant's exercise of the
right to trial, by the race, wealth or bail status of the defendant, by a
defense attorney's success in threatening the court's or the prosecutor's time with dilatory motions, by the publicity that a case has
generated, or by any of a number of other factors-irrelevant to the
goals of the criminal process-that commonly influence plea bargaining today. 73
71 See D. OAxs & W. IEa., s, A CmuNrx. JuSTICE SYSTEM AN THE LNDImENT
178-96 (1968).
72
The enactment of a statutory provision specifying the reward that would
follow the entry of a guilty plea would, as suggested in the text, improve the present
system of plea negotiation. Paradoxically, however, this legislative provision might
be more vulnerable than the present system to constitutional challenge. See United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); but see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970).
73The use of administrative rulemaking procedures and the formulation of
internal guidelines for prosecutorial decisionmaking might provide another way to
reduce the influence of these extraneous factors. See, e.g., Vorenberg, Narrowing
the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DuxE L.J. 651, 680-82. I am not
convinced, however, that guidelines could domesticate prosecutorial sentencing
power to the extent that plea bargaining by prosecutors would become compatible
with the objectives of today's sentencing reformers for two reasons.
First, just as it is difficult or impossible for legislatures to specify all relevant
sentencing factors in advance, it is difficult or impossible for prosecutors to do so.
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The principal objection to a legislative specification of the
sentence differential between guilty-plea and trial defendants is that
it would make the penalty that our system imposes for the exercise
of the constitutional right to trial painfully apparent,7 4 and the open
legislative articulation of the principle that makes our system of
plea bargaining effective should indeed cause us to blush. Nevertheless, if sentencing reformers are unwilling to take this step toward
channeling and controlling the plea bargaining process, perhaps
they should abandon the reform effort. Determinate sentencing
statutes may not always make things worse, but unless they achieve
a major restriction of prosecutorial power, the reformers will not
accomplish the goal of more certain sentencing that they have
sought so earnestly and, to a considerable extent, so rightly.

Guidelines may tend to be so general as to provide only minimal constraints on a
prosecutor's discretion. Of course, it is hard to quarrel in the abstract with the
ideal of the rule of law. When a governmental decisionmaking process can be
reduced to a formula that will yield justice in a substantial majority of cases, the
development of rules and guidelines usually becomes worthwhile. Nevertheless, the
problem of balancing justice in the individual case against the desirability of legal
rules cannot be resolved without regard to the specific problem at hand. Rather
than call for less discretion and more rules in the abstract, it would be desirable
for the scholars currently enamored of this approach actually to try their hands at
drafting some useful guidelines.
Second, even reasonably specific guidelines may prove delusive in practice.
Prosecutorial guidelines seem to be frequently honored in the breach, see, e.g.,
G.EoRGETowN U rviEasrry LAw CENTER INsTnTuTE OF CrthIJNAL LAW AND PNoCEDUEE, PtEA BARGA ,NG n, i=
UNn=ED STATEs: PH"AE I REPORT 33, 124 (1977).

Indeed, these guidelines may sometimes be intended more for show than for implementation. In Houston, Texas, the District Attorney once announced a policy
against recommending less than a ten-year sentence in any case of robbery by
firearm, yet a number of Houston defense attorneys told me of cases in which their
skillful bargaining had led to less severe prosecutorial sentence recommendations
for their clients. Most of these defense attorneys seemed unaware that other
attorneys were achieving the same success, and it gradually became apparent that
the District Attorney's announced policy served in practice as a sales device comparable to that of some Maxwell Street clothing merchants: "Our usual price in a
case of robbery by firearm is ten years, but for you .... " Partly because plea
bargaining policies are usually subject to ill-defined exceptions for "weak cases,"
see, e.g., Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976), this
sort of evasion does seem common. In addition, prosecutors frequently subvert
office policies by taking "unofficial" positions "off the record" and by agreeing
"not to oppose" actions that they cannot affirmatively recommend. Dale Tooley,
the District Attorney in Denver, commented that his office had developed guidelines
for a variety of prosecutorial decisions and had generally found them useful. He
added, however, "I have yet to see the policy that an assistant district attorney
couldn't get around when he wanted to." Interview with Mr. Tooley in Denver
(July 11, 1977). Although one might provide for judicial review at the behest of
disgruntled citizens (or perhaps some other device for enforcing prosecutorial rules),
it is far from clear that this mechanism would yield beneficial results as often as it
proved burdensome and oppressive.
74

See note 72 supra.
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CONCLUSION

This article has not suggested that our criminal justice system is
a closed, watertight mechanism in which discretion can be reallocated but never reduced. Nevertheless, one must evaluate proposals for sentencing reform in light of the existence within the
criminal justice system of diverse locations of sentencing power.
Eliminating or restricting the discretionary powers of parole boards
and trial judges is likely to increase the powers of prosecutors, and
these powers are likely to be exercised without effective limits
through the practice of plea bargaining. The substitution of fixed
or presumptive sentences for the discretion of judges and parole
boards tends to concentrate sentencing power in the hands of
officials who are likely to allow their decisions to be governed by
factors irrelevant to the proper goals of sentencing-officials moreover, who typically lack the information, objectivity, and experience of trial judges.
Some reformers may believe that prosecutorial discretion is
more valuable than judicial discretion, and if so, they have things
topsy-turvy. The reformers have levelled their attack-a basically
well-founded if somewhat one-sided attack-on the form of discretion that is most frequently exercised "on the merits" of criminal
cases for the purpose of taking differences in culpability into account. They have disregarded the form of discretion that is most
frequently bent, manipulated, twisted and perverted to gain convictions when guilt cannot be proven, to make the work of participants in the criminal justice system more comfortable, and to
save the money that might otherwise be required to implement the
right to trial. If the reformers hope to do more than to reallocate
today's lawless sentencing power in a way that will give prosecutors
an even heavier club, they must exhibit greater courage. They
must view the criminal justice system as a system, recognize that the
ideal of equal justice is currently threatened more by the practices
of prosecutors than by those of trial judges, and bite the bullet on
the question of plea bargaining.

